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April 25, 1958

Satellite Paper



1. a. Before us March 26 editorial revision by the Board Assistants of the prior draft of "U. S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Satellites." Excellent job of arrangement and expression.

2. b. Includes general considerations and policy guidance as to nations involved. Reference to Tlayor's paper on Rumania.

c. Section on Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania. Not reviewed by Board Assistants. These areas are now part of USSR - not satellites. Should be included at all? Only as Annex?

d. Top Secret Appendix to old Satellite paper. Position? NSC decided it continued to apply to Poland. Note places in paper which reflect its tone -- Par. 35-b, for example.

e. Relation with other NSC policies.

- (1) Note East Germany footnote - p. 1. East Germany should be reviewed. (see par. 6-b below).
- (2) On p. 18, footnotes as to Civil Aviation and East-West Exchanges.
- (3) Note Par. 16-a and c on Defectors (compare with Pars. 6-b and 16 of NSC 5706/2).

3. Relation to draft Basic National Security Policy.

a. Sprague's memo -- too much emphasis in early draft on relaxing pressures on satellites and over elimination of objectives of minimizing satellites' contribution to Soviet power.

b. But in Basic Policy draft this position has been generally taken, without objection. See 36-a, NSC 5810, on encouraging expansion of Exchanges between U. S. and Bloc, and pars. 35-a(3) and (4), 36-a(1), 38, on fostering and accelerating evolutionary changes.

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4. Basic Questions: Should U. S. move from policy of ostracism of Soviet-dominated regions to one of more active U. S. relations with these nations?

a. Par. 10 -- ostracism has inhibited direct U. S. contacts.

b. Par. 3 -- policy of stimulating evolutionary change is best way of influencing satellites in view of U. S. not being prepared to use force or threat of force. Note that this revision eliminates objective in IFC 5600/1, Par. 11, of minimizing satellite contribution to Soviet power.

c. Par. 59 thinks in exchanges lie best potential for influencing satellite developments; increased trade (Par. 50) more equivocal results.

d. Last NSC Progress Report noted: contradiction between U. S. traditional anti-Communist posture and U. S. seeking to develop national Communism.

e. New measures to make more active relations. Par. 40 -- negotiate partial solutions; Par. 41 -- try to bring countries into international organizations; Par. 42 -- phase out U. S. support of some extreme organizations; Par. 51 -- settle long-standing economic issues.

f. Having regularized relations. Expand Exchanges. Par. 42 -- private group contacts; Par. 47 -- touring; Par. 49 -- visits; Par. 52 -- trade fairs; Par. 53 -- students, teachers, leaders, etc. Also Par. 40 -- expand U. S. and West European-satellite trade relations in non-strategic items; Par. 53 -- establish usual information and cultural programs.



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5. Sub-Issue A -- To what extent should the U. S. continue its policy of exploitation of vulnerabilities of Soviet-dominated regimes?

a. Existing policy -- Par. 3, NSC 5505/1 and Par. 16 to 19, NSC 5608/1 -- call for:

Creating and increasing popular and bureaucratic pressures through exploitation of discontents;

Depicting causes of discontents as being susceptible to correction by non-revolutionary means;

Stating the evils of the system, but stressing evolutionary change;

Causing regimes to occupy themselves with internal problems; and

Posing difficult decisions which create divisions and uncertainties in the regimes.

b. Proposed revision -- existing policy (Paras. 35-a and 43) -- provides:

For creating popular (but not bureaucratic) pressures;

For pointing out the evils of the system and continuing to stress evolutionary change;

But not for causing the regimes to occupy themselves with internal problems or for posing difficult decisions for the regimes.



6. Sub-Issue B - Should U. S. foster disruptive influences in Satellites as a means of minimizing Satellite contributions to Soviet power, or should U. S. abandon this objective?

a. Existing policy:

Par. 14-b -- Objective of minimizing Satellite contributions to Soviet power.

Par. 20 -- Encourage passive resistance.

Par. 1, Top Secret Appendix -- Avoid incitement to violence but don't discourage spontaneous expressions of opposition.

Par. 21, Par. 2, T3A -- Foster nationalism as disruptive force.

Par. 24 -- Exploit conflicts in ruling groups and between them and Kremlin.

b. Proposed revision: A shift to a somewhat less provocative policy even if the T3 Appendix continues unchanged.

Par. 35-b -- Don't encourage violent uprisings; encourage countries to seek independence without internal disorder.

Par. 36 -- Foster nationalist pride.

Par. 37 -- Avoid actions indicating U. S. support for pre-war authoritarian regimes.

(Note Par. 62, NIE -- U. S. negotiations with USSR will have an adverse effect on morale Satellite peoples.)

(Note certain omissions from existing policy above and emphasis instead on exchanges, trade, etc.)



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Other Questions or Issues.

7. The last progress report stated that present policy does not give adequate consideration to the impact which the free countries of Western Europe could have on the evolutionary process in Eastern Europe or to what the U. S. might do to increase this impact (Par. 2-g).

a. The only guidance on this subject in the new paper is the provision (Par. 48) that Western European countries should be encouraged to gradually expand their economic relations with Soviet-dominated countries. Is more guidance needed? (Vis., exchanges, cultural, tourism, etc.)

b. The old paper (Par. 26) provided for exploiting the developing organizations of Western unity (NATO, OEEC, CSC, etc.) "as a force of attraction for the Satellites" and for emphasizing the concept of a free European community to include ultimately Eastern European countries. Why omitted in this draft?

8. The progress report stated that some agencies have found that NSC policies do not give sufficient guidance for the development of operations in Eastern Europe as they relate to the USSR, Yugoslavia and East Germany (Par. 2-d).

a. Par. 45 of the new draft calls for exploitation of U. S. relations with Yugoslavia and Poland. As noted under Sub-Issue B above, the new draft does not call for stimulating conflict between the Satellites and the Kremlin. Is the guidance provided by the new draft on this general problem considered adequate?

b. The President recently reaffirmed present policy toward East Germany (Supplement II, NSC 5803) with the understanding that, when the Planning Board reviewed Satellite policy, it would consider whether to review East Germany policy. Unless we are to pursue a different policy toward East Germany from that toward the other Soviet-dominated regimes (which is conceivable), it seems quite clear that in connection with State's proposed new policy a review of the East German policy will be necessary.

The present East German paper is like the old policy of disruption, perhaps because of a different situation in East Germany. If the East German policy is to be reformed to be like the new Satellite policy, a revision of the East German policy will be required.

